資安驗證 (Cybersecurity Validation) 目標與策略

為什麼需要獨立的 Validation?

Important

Clause 10 的 Verification 確認「需求被正確實作」。
但 Clause 11 的 Validation 問的是另一個問題:「整車情境下,CS Goals 真的被達成嗎?」

範例:


Validation 的核心特徵

1. 車輛層級 (Vehicle-level)
   • 整車情境,非單一元件
   • 含跨 ECU 互動

2. 從攻擊者視角
   • 真實攻擊面
   • 真實攻擊技術

3. 對應 CS Goals
   • 每個 CS Goal 至少一個 Validation 活動
   • 直接證明 Goal 達成

4. 含滲透測試 (Penetration Testing)
   • Clause 11 規範要求
   • 不可省略

Validation Objectives

validation_objectives:
  - "Verify that all CS Goals are achieved at vehicle level"
  - "Verify that CS Claims hold in operational environment"
  - "Identify residual cybersecurity risks at vehicle level"
  - "Provide evidence for Cybersecurity Case (top-level claim)"

Validation 範圍

        ┌────────────────────────────────┐
        │      Vehicle-level Validation   │
        │                                 │
        │  • 整車測試平台 (HIL 或實車)     │
        │  • 多 ECU 互動                  │
        │  • 攻擊面完整                    │
        │  • 真實環境條件                  │
        │                                 │
        └────────────────────────────────┘
                      ↑
                      │ 整合
                      │
        ┌────────────────────────────────┐
        │  Component Verification (10)   │
        │  各元件已通過驗證                │
        └────────────────────────────────┘

Validation Plan

cs_validation_plan:
  scope: "Complete vehicle (EV Platform G3)"

  test_environment:
    primary: "HIL bench with all ECUs"
    secondary: "Real vehicle prototype (Sprint Eval)"

  test_team:
    internal: "OEM CS Validation Team"
    external: "Specialised pen test vendor"
    independence: "Independent of development team"

  cs_goals_to_validate:
    - id: CG-001
      goal: "Firmware integrity"
      validation_methods:
        - "OTA tampering test (vehicle-level)"
        - "Boot chain pen test"
      pass_criteria: "Tampered firmware rejected; no escalation possible"

    - id: CG-002
      goal: "Cellular comms confidentiality"
      validation_methods:
        - "MITM proxy attack"
        - "Cert pinning bypass test"
      pass_criteria: "All MITM attempts fail; logs reflect detection"

    - id: CG-003
      goal: "Diagnostic access control"
      validation_methods:
        - "UDS Security Access brute force"
        - "Session hijack attempt"
      pass_criteria: "No bypass possible; lockout works"

  attacker_models:
    - "Network attacker (Internet, Cellular)"
    - "Local attacker (parking lot, OBD)"
    - "Physical attacker (workshop tools)"
    - "Insider (limited credentials)"

  out_of_scope:
    - "Backend cloud (separate validation)"
    - "User mobile app (separate item)"

  schedule:
    start: 2027-03-01
    end: 2027-05-30
    re_test_for_findings: 2027-06-15

Validation 必須涵蓋

☑ 所有 CS Goals
☑ 所有 CS Claims(驗證假設成立)
☑ 攻擊面完整(含跨 ECU)
☑ 真實情境條件(如環境溫度、振動、不同 SoC)
☑ Attack scenarios from TARA
☑ Pen Test
☑ Negative testing(嘗試破壞)

Validation vs Verification 對照

比較 Verification Validation
Clause 10.4.3 11
層級 元件/系統 車輛
視角 需求對應 攻擊者
範圍 In-bound(需求清單) Out-of-bound(攻擊面完整)
對應 CS Requirement CS Goal
工具 SAST、UT、IT Pen Test、實車測試
結果 Verification Report Validation Report

00-Dashboard/Exam-Traps#Trap 5


Independence Requirement

Important

Validation 通常要求獨立性

  • 不應由開發團隊執行
  • 可由組織內獨立 CS Team 或外部專家

理由:避免「自評」帶來的盲點。


Validation Report

cs_validation_report:
  metadata:
    item: "TCU-2026 in EV Platform G3 vehicle"
    version: 1.0
    date: 2027-05-30

  scope:
    cs_goals_tested: [CG-001 to CG-012]
    attacker_models: ["Network", "Local", "Physical", "Insider"]

  results:
    cs_goal: CG-001
      validation_passed: true
      evidence:
        - "OTA tampering test: 50 attempts, all rejected"
        - "Boot chain pen test: no bypass found"
      residual_risk: "Low (theoretical attack on root cert, not feasible)"

    cs_goal: CG-002
      validation_passed: true
      with_findings: 1
      finding: "TLS downgrade attempt logged but not blocked actively"
      remediation: "Software update to actively reject TLS < 1.3"
      severity: Medium

    cs_goal: CG-003
      validation_passed: false  # ⚠
      finding: "UDS Security Access timing attack possible (sub-ms)"
      severity: High
      remediation_required: true
      target_remediation: "Before final release"

  pen_test_summary:
    duration: 8 weeks
    findings:
      critical: 0
      high: 1
      medium: 3
      low: 7

  recommendation: "CONDITIONAL APPROVE — fix CG-003 finding before Release"

與 Release for Post-Development 的關係

Validation Pass
   ↓
Cybersecurity Assessment
   ↓
Release for Post-Development(Clause 6.4.11)
   ↓
Production (12) + Operations (13)

Validation 失敗 → 不可 Release

03-Project-Dependent/07-Release-for-Post-Development


證照考點

高頻考點

  1. Validation 是車輛層級
  2. Validation 必須包含滲透測試
  3. Validation 獨立性要求(不可由開發團隊)
  4. Validation 對應 CS Goals(不是 Requirements)
  5. Validation 失敗 → 不可 Release
  6. Validation Report 是必要 WP
  7. CS Claims 也需 validation


Practice